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PRÉCIS

Cet article traite des contributions de Tim Edgar en tant que grand spécialiste du
droit comparé. Il passe en revue les principaux débats et orientations théoriques en droit
comparé, et propose une étude de cas des contributions de Tim Edgar à la lumière des
grands débats dans ce domaine. L’évolution de ce spécialiste en tant que comparatiste
est décrite en trois phases distinctes. L’article met en évidence la détermination du
problème de politique à résoudre comme un aspect majeur de sa contribution.
ABSTRACT

This paper focuses on the contributions of Tim Edgar as a major comparative law scholar.
It reviews the major debates and theoretical directions in comparative law scholarship
and offers a case study of Edgar’s contributions in the light of the major debates in
comparative law. Edgar’s development as a comparatist is traced through three defined
phases. His identification of the policy problem to be resolved is highlighted as a major
feature of his contribution.
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W H Y S T U DY T H E TA X L A W S O F O T H E R
CO U N T R I E S ?
Practitioners, policy makers, and academics regularly compare tax laws across
jurisdictions. The epistemic question is why. What kind of new knowledge does
comparison yield? A review of the substantial tax literature that uses comparative
law techniques reveals that authors look to the practices of other countries to
achieve multiple ends. In some cases, the authors’ aspirations are primarily doctrinal. They seek to understand the laws of another country in order to engage in
better tax planning, to learn more about their own tax law system (through the
study of it in comparison to alternatives), or simply to satisfy their curiosity about
how another country’s system is designed and functions.1 In other instances, the
authors’ aims are explanatory: to assess why some countries adopt different tax law
frameworks, administrative practices, or institutional designs.2 Sometimes, comparative tax scholarship is instrumental: an author cites tax laws or practices from
other jurisdictions in arguing for tax policy changes (and related changes in tax
design) in the author’s home country or more generally.3 Finally, and less often, the
aim of a comparative work is normative: the author uses comparative law to urge
countries to elevate some underlying value, such as equality or privacy, or to suggest
that countries’ tax laws should be harmonized or coordinated.4
Recognition of the growing complexity of commercial transactions and forms
has inspired renewed interest in comparative law generally and in comparative tax
law in particular, and practitioners and scholars have rapidly produced the literature
that defines the modern field. Tim Edgar was a remarkable, if perhaps unintentional, participant in the expansion and development of comparative tax scholarship.
His career path and his publication record offer a ready case study in tax comparativism, and his use of comparative law has some distinctive features that are worth
exploring.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, I review the
major debates and theoretical directions in comparative law scholarship, focusing
on recent work in the field. My goal here is to provide a framework against which
the contributions of comparative tax scholars, and of Tim Edgar in particular, can be
analyzed. The final section of the paper is a case study of Edgar’s contributions in
the light of the major debates in comparative law. It traces Edgar’s development

1 See, for example, Peter Harris, Corporate Tax Law: Structure, Policy and Practice (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2013).
2 See, for example, Cedric Sandford, Successful Tax Reform: Lessons from an Analysis of Tax Reform
in Six Countries (Fersfield, UK: Fiscal, 1993).
3 See, for example, Brian J. Arnold, “The Process of Tax Policy Formulation in Australia, Canada
and New Zealand” (1990) 7:4 Australian Tax Forum 379-94, at 381.
4 See, for example, Antony Ting, The Taxation of Corporate Groups Under Consolidation: An
International Comparison (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
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through three defined phases of comparative work, and it identifies his focus on the
identification of policy problems as a major feature of his contribution.

T H E Q U E S T I O N S O F CO M PA R AT I V E L A W
This paper does not attempt to cover the literature on comparative law in a detailed
way.5 That literature has a long history; in its modern incarnation, it may be traced
to 1900 Paris and the International Congress of Comparative Law.6 Rather, my aim
in this paper is to highlight the preoccupations of comparative law scholars, with a
view to better informing an analysis of Tim Edgar’s contributions to the field.
To oversimply, comparative law scholars are concerned with five major questions:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

What is comparative law?
What unit of comparison is used?
What is compared?
From what perspective is the comparison undertaken?
What process should be adopted to effect the comparison?

An overview of comparative law scholarship divulges no definitive answer to the
first, most fundamental question: What is comparative law? Over a century’s worth
of debates among comparatists has provided few assurances even about the basic
question of whether comparative law is a distinct science or simply a method that
can be applied in any area of jurisprudence.7 Nevertheless, there is some consensus
on the taxonomy of approaches to comparative law projects.8 Although there is
5 This paper has benefited from a number of relatively recent, outstanding books on comparative
law. See, for example, Maurice Adams and Dirk Heirbaut, eds., The Method and Culture of
Comparative Law: Essays in Honour of Mark Van Hoecke (Oxford: Hart, 2015); Michael Bogdan,
Concise Introduction to Comparative Law (Groningen: Europa Law, 2013); William E. Butler,
O.V. Kresin, and Iu Shemshuchenko, Foundations of Comparative Law: Methods and Typologies
(London: Wildy, Simmonds & Hill, 2011); Nicholas H.D. Foster, Michael Palmer, and Maria
Federica Moscati, Interdisciplinary Study and Comparative Law (London: Wildy, Simmonds &
Hill, 2016); Jaakko Husa, A New Introduction to Comparative Law (Oxford: Hart, 2015); Pier
Giuseppe Monateri, ed., Methods of Comparative Law, Research Handbooks in Comparative
Law (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2012); and Geoffrey Samuel, An Introduction to
Comparative Law Theory and Method (Oxford: Hart, 2014).
6 H. Patrick Glenn, “Against Method?” in The Method and Culture of Comparative Law, supra
note 5, 177-88, at 183. (Glenn acknowledges this origin story and further claims that
comparison of law has been around for much longer than this story suggests.)
7 For a discussion of these debates, see Geoffrey Samuel, “Comparative Law and Jurisprudence”
(1998) 47:4 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 817-36.
8 The many excellent taxonomies of comparative law theories include Jaakko Husa, “Research
Designs of Comparative Law—Methodology or Heuristics?” in The Method and Culture of
Comparative Law, supra note 5, 53-68. See also the two standard comparative law
encyclopedias: Mathias Reimann and Reinhard Zimmermann, eds., The Oxford Handbook of
Comparative Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); and Jan M. Smits, ed., Elgar
Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, 2d ed. (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2012).
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disagreement about precisely how these frameworks, along with their scholarly
adherents, should be categorized, it seems useful, broadly speaking, to divide comparatists into five camps.
Functionalist approaches continue to dominate comparative law scholarship.9
The basic thrust of the functionalist approach (or approaches) is to look at how
multiple jurisdictions tackle through legal regulation the same underlying social,
political, or economic issue. Despite this common denominator, as one of the main
proponents of functionalism observes,
[a]s a theory [functionalism] hardly exists, at least in an elaborated version. The standard
reference text for supporters and opponents alike is a brief chapter in an introductory
textbook, a text that in its original conception is almost half a century of age and whose
author, Zweigert, expressed both disdain for methodological debate and a preference
for inspiration over methodological rigour as the comparatist’s ultimate guide.10

Put another way, functionalists adopt a variety of approaches, often determined
by the particular outcome the scholar seeks. In the main, adherents of the functionalist approach may be identified by three (or perhaps four) chief tendencies: (1) they
focus on the facts as reflected by the effects of rules; (2) they see law in the light of
its functional relationship to society and therefore believe that law and society can
be separated; and (3) they maintain that institutions can be compared if they fulfill
similar functions, even if they exist in different legal systems.11 Finally, most (but
not all) functionalists share the view that comparative law can provide guidance in
determining which legal resolutions are better than others.
The most striking counter-theory to functionalism might be described as a
cultural (or hermeneutics) approach to comparative law scholarship. As with functionalism, the scope and underlying principles of cultural comparativism are
debated even by those who adhere to it.12 What unifies work in the cultural school
is the shared view that law is simply a signifier of a culture or mentality. The
scholar who adopts this approach must develop an appreciation of his or her role as
a culturally situated interpreter. This leads to (1) considerable skepticism about the
very possibility of comparativism, (2) heavy questioning of comparativism’s potential value, and (3) a significant cynicism about whether one country’s laws can ever
be appropriate for, or transplanted to, another country.

9 There is a rich literature on each of these functionalist approaches. See, for example, Ralf
Michaels, “The Functional Method of Comparative Law,” in The Oxford Handbook of
Comparative Law, supra note 8, 339-82; and Catherine Valcke and Mathew Grellette, “Three
Functions of Function in Comparative Legal Studies,” in The Method and Culture of Comparative
Law, supra note 5, 99-112.
10 Michaels, supra note 9, at 340-41 (notes omitted).
11 Ibid., at 342.
12 The quintessential cultural comparatist is Pierre Legrand. See, for example, Pierre Legrand,
Le droit comparé, 5th ed. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2015).
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Historically, there was greater emphasis than there is now on what is sometimes
referred to as a structuralist approach to comparative law study. This line of scholarship seeks to identify structurally similar elements between systems. For example, a
structuralist approach to comparative law might compare how branches of law in
different jurisdictions are differentiated in similar or different ways. In the main,
this line of work appears to have become less prominent or to have been subsumed
into the broad category of functionalism, although, occasionally, a work of scholarship emerges that appears to be rooted firmly in the structuralist tradition.
More recently, a strand of work has emerged in comparative law that might be
described as critical comparative study, or critical comparativism.13 Scholars
working in this theoretical vein have proceeded in a variety of ways. Some may be
identified on the basis of their commitment to using comparative law to expose the
power dynamics involved in the formulation of legal responses. Others have focused
on bringing a broader frame into view—for example, by stepping outside the usual
comparative concerns with identifying similarities and differences, and focusing,
instead, more on the consequences of legal regulation. Still other critical comparatists start by identifying legal “formants” (“a type of personnel, or a community,
institutionally involved in the activity of creating Law”)14 and then seek to look at
what those institutions or institutional actors produce as legal text instead of starting, as functionalists do, by identifying a common underlying problem that law seeks
to address. At their heart, however, all critical comparatist approaches undertake, as
an aspect of their method, an unveiling of how powerful players and institutions
influence the design of legal institutions.15
Finally, there is an orientation to comparative law—an approach often ignored
in the standard taxonomy of comparative law theories—that sees its function as
providing “the cognitive frames through which social actors, including legal and
social scientific observers, apprehend social realities.”16 Under this model, which
contrasts with that of some mid- and late-20th-century scholars 17 but is close, arguably, to that of the 19th century pre-comparatists, comparative law provides an

13 For an illustration, see Pier Giuseppe Monateri, “Methods in Comparative Law: An
Intellectual Overview,” in Methods of Comparative Law, supra note 5, at 7-24.
14 Ibid., at 7.
15 As stated by Monateri, “[W]hat I claim as a new outline of the task of Comparative Law is an
insight into the ‘ceaseless discursive warfare’ which is fought within legal cultures among
competing groups” (ibid., at 21 [notes omitted]).
16 Annalise Riles, “Comparative Law and Socio-Legal Studies,” in The Oxford Handbook of
Comparative Law, supra note 8, at 775-813, at 808.
17 Riles analyzes this evolution as follows: “Unlike other legal fields, for example, over the course
of the twentieth century comparative law moves towards a more radical separation from other
disciplines, their methods and their work. From the 1930s forward, the ideal reader of twentiethcentury comparative legal scholarship is the law professor and, even more importantly, the
bureaucrat or the judge, not the social scientist” (Annelise Riles, “Introduction,” in Annelise
Riles, ed., Rethinking the Masters of Comparative Law [Oxford: Hart, 2001] 1-18, at 10).
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avenue for fierce interdisciplinarity. Annelise Riles, who is perhaps the most prominent proponent of this sociolegal comparativism,18 has identified some of its broad
themes and directions. These include the effects of globalization on the practice of
law; a resurgence of interest in the role of the rule of law, particularly in lower-income
countries; the consequences of globalization for national and local regulatory practices; legal pluralism and its consequences for comparison; the consequences of the
social dimensions of legal transnationalism for legal transplants; and the role of
legal culture, whether as an explanatory tool or as a barrier to legal importation.19
Before I conclude this overview of the competing approaches to comparative law,
it might be helpful to address the rich literature on legal transplants.20 That literature, which concerns the migration of law (or legal processes, institutions, or ideas
about law) from one jurisdiction to another, is often slightly divorced from, although
always connected with, the comparative law literature. It is divorced from it in the
sense that scholars of legal transplant theory often make only minimal reference to
the different “schools of thought,” or approaches to comparative law, that I have
identified in this overview. Still, the scholarship on legal transplants might be best
understood as a specific strand of the debate between the functionalist and culturalist schools of comparative law. This scholarship seeks to explore and explain why
some transplants are effective and others are not. To oversimplify, functionalists
tend to proffer a range of explanations for why legal transplants are effective or not,
while cultural comparativists tend to hold that most (or all) transplants are ineffective, given the importance and influence of the cultural foundations to which legal
rules are inevitably affixed.
In the remainder of this section of the paper, I provide a brief review of the
remaining four questions (listed above) that concern comparative law scholars.21
First, what unit of comparison is to be used in undertaking comparative law scholarship? Speaking generally, comparative law operates at the level of the nation-state.
Most of the work that is identified with the comparative law movement seeks to
compare one nation’s legal system with another’s, even though comparative work at
the subnational level (for example, comparing one state or province with another)
would presumably qualify as comparative law scholarship. A smaller body of work

18 See, for example, ibid., Rethinking the Masters of Comparative Law.
19 See Riles, supra note 16, at 789-99.
20 For the mandatory starting place, see Alan Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to
Comparative Law, 2d ed. (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1993) (first published in
1974). See also, for example, Pierre Legrand, “The Impossibility of ‘Legal Transplants’ ” (1997)
4:2 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 111-24; and Mathias M. Siems, “The
Curious Case of Overfitting Legal Transplants,” in The Method and Culture of Comparative Law,
supra note 5, 133-46.
21 For a helpful review of the questions raised in this part of the chapter, see Esin Örücü,
“Developing Comparative Law,” in Esin Örücü and David Nelken, eds., Comparative Law:
A Handbook (Portland: Hart, 2007), 43-65.
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attempts to compare countries by legal “family” (usually drawing on a common historical evolutionary pattern) or by legal tradition or culture.22
Comparative law scholars also debate the ontological question of what to compare. The more conventional approaches to comparative law look to formal
expressions of law, generally to state-made law, whether expressed in the form of
legislation or cases. Recently, however, scholars have become more innovative in
their use of comparative approaches and have sought to use comparative law as a
lens through which to consider legal institutions, legal structures, administrative
practices, regulatory practices, legal cultures, legal actors, and even the problems
(social, economic, and political) addressed by law.23
As with many methodologies, there has been a fierce debate about the position
of the researcher relative to the subject of study. Some scholars allege that comparative work can be undertaken only by legal insiders and that a scholar cannot
effectively compare two legal regimes without deep knowledge of the social, economic, and political conditions in each. William Ewald espouses that view, claiming
that if “one’s aim is to understand the ideas that lie behind the foreign legal system
(and . . . this should be the aim of comparative law) the sociological data and rulebooks alike are unable to furnish what we want, which is a grasp, from the inside, of
the conscious reasons and principles and conceptions that are employed by the
foreign lawyers.”24 Others allege that it is only by remaining an outsider that a
scholar can truly appreciate the contours of the object of study. Thus, for example,
James Whitman argues that an outsider might uncover “differences in unarticulated
assumptions” that “will frequently be the most revealing and gratifying work a
comparatist can do.”25
The process used for comparison (that is, the method) exposes something about
the objectives of the study. Some comparatists have laid out in considerable detail
the precise steps to be followed in undertaking comparative study. For example,
Jaakko Husa’s summary of the technical decisions to be made in developing a
research project in comparative law includes the following alternatives:

22 See H. Patrick Glenn, “Comparative Legal Families and Comparative Legal Traditions,” in
The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law, supra note 8, 421-40.
23 As Geoffrey Samuel asks, “[W]hat actually forms the object of comparison[?] Is it a question of
comparing rules, norms, concepts, institutions, categories, systems, factual situations, reasoning
techniques or what?” (Geoffrey Samuel, “What Is Legal Epistemology” in The Method and
Culture of Comparative Law, supra note 5, 23-36, at 26.)
24 See William Ewald, “Legal History and Comparative Law” (1999) Zeitschrift für Europäisches
Privatrecht 553, at 555-56; cited in Samuel, An Introduction to Comparative Law, supra note 5.
25 See James Q. Whitman, “The Neo-Romantic Turn,” in Pierre Legrand and Roderick Munday,
eds., Comparative Legal Studies: Traditions and Transitions (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2003), 312-44, at 336.
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micro/macro,
longitudinal/traverse,
multilateral/bilateral,
vertical/horizontal, and
monocultural/multicultural.26

In other words, comparative law projects can compare narrow institutions or
issues or they can compare fundamental characteristics or functions; they can be
based on the current circumstances or they can take a longer-term perspective; they
can focus on two jurisdictions or on multiple jurisdictions; they can compare similar
systems (as in, for example, country-to-country comparison) or they can compare
layered systems (for example, supranational versus national, or national formal laws
versus some other kind of normative order); and they can focus on systems in the
same general cultural sphere or systems whose cultural contexts are distinct. Identifying where a comparative study lands with respect to these various choices reveals
much about the author’s otherwise implicit views on comparativism and law.
Other scholars (for example, Esin Örücü) have explored the differing steps required for a comparative law method, finding some approaches to be more fruitful
than others. Örücü endorses an approach with at least five phases.27 The first phase
requires the scholar to conceptualize the project. Scholars should choose meso- or
micro-comparison, the sources of law or legal systems, and so on. In brief, the
scholar elects what to compare, with an eye to the theoretical framework—whether
that framework is functionalism, structuralism, or another interdisciplinary approach.
In the second phase, the scholar undertakes to describe the norms, concepts, and
institutions of the chosen systems. This is the observation phase. The third phase is
the identification phase, in which the scholar takes note of similarities and differences; a phase that Örücü also refers to as “the classification phase.” In the fourth
phase, the scholar works to explain those divergences and similarities.28 The fifth
and final, theory-testing phase seeks to test or suggest hypotheses that might transcend the cases being compared. Örücü notes that some projects may also include

26 Husa, supra note 8, at 57. For a similar list of decisions that need to be taken before a
comparative project is undertaken, see Bogdan, supra note 5, at 45.
27 A. Esin Örücü, “Methodology of Comparative Law,” in Elgar Encyclopedia of Comparative Law,
supra note 8, at 567-71.
28 The comparative law literature is weakest when it comes to this process of explanation—that is,
delineating the kinds of factors that might be relevant for the purpose of explaining differences
and similarities. This weakness may stem from the fact that such identification is more likely to
be aligned with the questions asked in political science. For a brief list of relevant factors, see
Bogdan, supra note 5, at 57-62. (Bogdan identifies differences in the economic system, the
political system and ideology, religion, history and geography, demographic factors, coinfluences [for example, other control mechanisms like collective bargaining agreements], and
accidental or unknown factors.) See also Husa, supra note 5, at chapter 7 (which adds culture
and climate to the list).
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an evaluation phase, in which the comparatist seeks to discover whether one approach
is better than another.
The foregoing overview of the questions and directions of comparative law
scholarship, although it oversimplifies considerably the dense and intense scholarly
debates that have been held among comparatists for well over a century, has provided, I hope, sufficient context to enable us to assess one scholar’s contributions to
the field.

A MODEL INSIDER
Tim Edgar made a remarkable contribution to tax scholarship. Over the course of
his career, he authored at least 40 journal articles (many of them well over 60 pages),
six book chapters, one major report, one monograph, one co-authored casebook,
and several introductions.29 Although he had a few publications that stood substantively alone (for example, on capital gains,30 the concept of taxable consumption,31
charitable giving,32 trusts,33 and source attribution34), most of his work was focused
on corporate income tax issues and the taxation of financial instruments in both income and consumption taxes, with a minor strand devoted to general anti-avoidance
rules. To frame it another way, the focus of Edgar’s work was the exercise of drawing
the line between substitutable activities or transactions in a second-best world (where
it is unlikely that policy makers could be convinced to abandon the line altogether).
Except for his casebook, all of his work had better tax policy as its ultimate aim (and
perhaps even his casebook had that aim, albeit indirectly), and much of this work
undoubtedly benefited from his comparative study. Twelve of Edgar’s scholarly
contributions adopt a comparative approach, and these works are the focus of the
remainder of this paper.

29 Publications list compiled by Alan Macnaughton, on file with author.
30 Brian Arnold and Tim Edgar, “Selected Aspects of Capital Gains Taxation in Australia, New
Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States” (1995) 21, supp. Canadian Public Policy
S58-76.
31 Tim Edgar, “The Concept of Taxable Consumption and the Deductibility of Expenses Under
an Ideal Personal Income Tax Base,” in Richard Krever, ed., Tax Conversations: A Guide to the
Key Issues in the Tax Reform Debate: Essays in Honour of John G. Head (The Hague: Kluwer Law
International, 1997), 293-363.
32 Daniel Sandler and Tim Edgar, “The Tax Expenditure Program for Charitable Giving:
Kicking a Gift Horse in the Teeth” (2003) 51:6 Canadian Tax Journal 2193-2214.
33 Tim Edgar, “Deemed Realization of the Trust Property: Proposed Amendments to the 21-Year
Rule” (1992) 11:3 Estates & Trusts Journal 207-43; and Tim Edgar, “The Trouble with Income
Trusts” (2004) 52:3 Canadian Tax Journal 819-52 (although arguably his interest in this topic
was connected to his work on corporate income taxation, and so the article is not an outlier).
34 Tim Edgar and David Holland, “Source Taxation and the OECD Project on Attribution of
Profits to Permanent Establishments” (2005) 37:6 Tax Notes International 525-539.

134  n  canadian tax journal / revue fiscale canadienne

(2020) 68:1

The First Decade (1987-2000): Careful and Sustained Study
of a Small Number of Jurisdictions
Edgar’s career offers a model study in thoughtful comparative tax scholarship. His
first article, which he published as an LLM student in 1987, was on the tax rules that
apply when a corporation borrows money to finance a foreign subsidiary. His
publication of this article in the Australian Tax Forum constitutes dramatic foreshadowing: throughout his career, his interest in certain comparator countries and in the
taxation of financial instruments remained steadfast.35 In this early article, Edgar
reviews the Canadian position on the deductibility of interest incurred to finance a
foreign subsidiary in Canada, and he compares this position with the equivalent
positions of Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Even in this
early work, Edgar is an adept comparatist. Instead of simply reciting the rules of each
of the four jurisdictions, he offers an integrated summary of how the practices of
Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States vary from the Canadian
approach, and he reviews with specificity alternative policy options, assessing each
against clearly articulated tax policy criteria.
Where some scholars dip occasionally into the ocean of comparative tax law,
Edgar revealed himself very quickly to be a keen and adept swimmer. His second
comparative piece was published in 1990, “The Classification of Corporate Securities.”36 His career mantra is captured by a line early in this article: “[T]ax law
should not treat economically similar transactions differently.”37 In this article,
Edgar reviews in detail proposed American regulations on securities classification.
He found reason for optimism in the United States’ willingness to worry about the
classification of debt held by shareholders. However, ever dissatisfied with rules that
ignore the economic substance of financial instruments, Edgar identified substantial
inadequacies in the American approach proposed at the time—inadequacies in both
the legislative framework and the judicial decisions (which, he argued, lacked any
organizing principle).38 In the comparative tax literature, it is rare to find a scholar
reviewing another country’s rules in order to identify their inadequacies. On the
basis of his analysis of the failings of both the Canadian and American systems,
Edgar recommends an approach that would (1) draw the debt-equity line at one of
the far ends of the spectrum between debt and equity and (2) classify everything else
as the alternative. He argues that this approach (assuming that we live in a world
where debt and equity are unlikely to be treated the same) would best serve to
minimize tax planning.

35 Tim Edgar, “The Corporate Interest Deduction and the Financing of Foreign Subsidiaries”
(1987) 4:4 Australian Tax Forum 491-528.
36 Tim Edgar, “The Classification of Corporate Securities for Income Tax Purposes” (1990) 38:5
Canadian Tax Journal 1141-88.
37 Ibid., at 1145. (Persuading the Supreme Court of Canada of this point was not among Edgar’s
successes.)
38 Ibid., at 1162.
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In 1992, Edgar is back in the pages of the Canadian Tax Journal, where he published most of his work.39 He has fixed his comparative eye firmly on Australia and
the United States, this time with a view to pressing for policy reform of Canada’s
thin capitalization rules. In this article, Edgar praises Canada’s approach to its thin
capitalization rules, arguing that they should be expanded, and he offers a nod to
some design features of the US and Australian rules. He explicitly justifies the choices
of Australia and the United States: they are countries that impose thin capitalization
rules by legislation rather than by administrative guidance,40 and he assesses their
legislative frameworks to be more comprehensive than Canada’s. Atypically for his
comparative work, Edgar, in this article, presents each country’s rules in turn. While
this presentation makes for easy reading, it leaves the comparative work to the
reader. Edgar proceeds to draw on the Australian and US experiences as he reviews
in meticulous detail the various policy choices reflected in the design of each country’s thin capitalization rules, and he offers an assessment of the pros and cons of
variations on each of those policy choices.41 To that end, the comparator countries
are used as a mechanism to help Edgar identify a wide range of policy alternatives.
Three years later, Edgar returns with an article, co-authored with Brian Arnold,
comparing capital gains taxation in Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom,
and the United States.42 At its outset, the article offers a clarifying discussion of
both its focus and its choice of comparator countries. The authors are explicit about
rejecting a high-level overview of many countries and opting instead for a narrow
cluster of countries and a limit on the number of features of capital gains taxation
that are subject to review.43 The four countries are chosen because the authors
believe that they provide a fairly representative sampling of approaches, because
they share a common-law tradition, and because they are major trading partners for
Canada. The article advocates, implicitly, for harmonization among Canada and the
four countries.44 The comparative review is organized under headings that highlight

39 Tim Edgar, “The Thin Capitalization Rules: Role and Reform” (1992) 40:1 Canadian Tax
Journal 1-54. Macnaughton’s publication list suggests that Edgar published at least 18 major
articles with the Canadian Tax Journal, in addition to minor contributions.
40 Ibid., at 10. (Although it is unclear why this difference matters.)
41 Ibid. Specifically, Edgar examines in this article the definition of a specified non-resident
(32-33), the appropriate level of share ownership (33-37), the relevant debt-to-equity ratio
(37-39), the calculation of debt and equity (39-44), the clawback of short-term equity (44-46),
loanbacks (46-47), hybrid securities (47), consolidation (47-48), the calculation and treatment
of interest on excess indebtedness (48-50), the issuers and investors subject to the rule (50-53),
and the debt creation rules (53-54). On most policy issues, Edgar does not recommend a
specific option for Canada; instead, he lays out in detail the various policy options, and assesses
which of them seem suitable for Canada.
42 Arnold and Edgar, supra note 30.
43 Ibid., at S58-59.
44 “In an increasingly globalized and competitive economy, Canada’s tax system cannot differ
significantly from the tax systems of its trading partners” (ibid., at S59).
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some of the major design features of capital gains taxation (for example, under the
heading “Special Exemptions,” the authors discuss the distinction between capital
gains and ordinary income, short- versus long-term gains, gains on shares, debt
obligations, gains on real property and principal residences, relief for small businesses, gains on personal-use property, realization and rollovers, instalment sales,
dividends compared with capital gains, and miscellaneous receipts). Each section of
the article addresses in summary form the general approach taken by each country.
Ultimately, the authors discover that in contrast to what might be predicted, Canada
and the four other countries vary dramatically from one another in their design of
capital gains taxation. The authors underscore the particularly anomalous provision
by Canada of the $100,000 lifetime exemption.45 Although the authors do not
expressly recommend the removal of this provision, they seem to intend for readers
to infer such a recommendation.
In 1996, Edgar published a major article on the concept of interest in the Income
Tax Act.46 Of this article’s 70 pages, only 11 are devoted to a discussion of the legislative approach taken in other countries (primarily New Zealand).47 However,
Edgar’s capacity to make sense of the tax law in other jurisdictions—and his willingness to stay abreast of the laws of Australia and New Zealand in particular—shines
through. He explains the comprehensive accrual regime adopted by New Zealand
in 1987, and he offers an accessible summary of that complicated regime. For the
first time in one of his comparative works, Edgar uses New Zealand legislation as a
model for the rules that Canada should adopt.48
By the end of the 1990s, Edgar’s answer to most of the major comparative law
debates is clear. He is an untroubled functionalist, never questioning his position as
an interpreter of others’ laws and concerned primarily (although at this stage still
45 Ibid., at S70.
46 Tim Edgar, “The Concept of Interest Under the Income Tax Act” (1996) 44:2 Canadian Tax
Journal 277-347. This appears to be the only article of Edgar’s in which he took case law
seriously. See, for example, his description of the Supreme Court’s work in tax cases as “tax
follies” (Tim Edgar, “Policy Forum: Interest Deductibility Restrictions—Expecting Too Much
from REOP?” (2004) 52:4 Canadian Tax Journal 1130-72, at 1132). (See also Andrea Black,
“Timothy W. Edgar (1960-2016),” December 27, 2016, online: Let’s Talk About Tax NZ
(letstalkabouttaxnz.com/2016/12/27/timothy-w-edgar-1960-2016) [perma.cc/64FK-3TX4].)
47 Edgar, “Concept of Interest Under the Income Tax Act,” supra note 46, at 337-47.
48 See ibid, at 346-47: “[A]ll debt-financing charges that economically represent the cost of credit
should be recognized for deductibility and inclusion purposes on an annual accrual basis. In the
face of an apparently limitless capacity for the development of sophisticated financial
instruments in the current marketplace, this goal can be most effectively realized through the
enactment of comprehensive accrual rules similar to those in New Zealand.” Similarly, in an
article that does not discuss in any detail the approaches taken by New Zealand or Australia,
Edgar urges Canada to follow these two countries’ lead in legislating to address the challenges
of taxing financial instruments (in response to the Supreme Court’s efforts to cope with
weak-currency borrowings in Shell Canada Ltd. v. Canada, [1999] 3 SCR 622 and Canadian
Pacific Limited v. Canada, [1999] SCCA no. 97): Tim Edgar, “Some Lessons from the Saga of
Weak-Currency Borrowings” (2000) 48:1 Canadian Tax Journal 1-34.
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relatively implicitly) with the policy problems that tax law seeks to resolve. He
engages at the macro level, choosing to focus on countries with similar legal traditions and languages. Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the importance of the legislative
basis of tax law, Edgar focuses almost exclusively on tax legislation, delving only
briefly into, and then without much deference for, tax jurisprudence.

The Second Decade (2000-2010): Comparativism That
Refocuses the Policy Debate
While Edgar’s work in the 1990s was characterized by a preoccupation with taxing
similar economic transactions similarly, his work in the 2000s expanded on that
insight to focus more directly on the harms that arise from tax avoidance when
governments fail in their duty to address such avoidance. Edgar kicked off the decade
with a massive monograph on the income tax treatment of financial instruments, a
work for which he has become justly renowned.49 This book, which he worked on
over a five-year period, was originally a doctoral dissertation prepared under the
tutelage of Canadian-born, Australian-employed, world-engaged tax expert Rick
Krever. In the monograph, Edgar borrows from Australia and New Zealand (primarily highlighting their proposed and enacted legislation, respectively) and the
United States (primarily borrowing from the work of US tax scholars). The preface
to the work reveals that Edgar did not merely read the law of those countries from
the comfort of his office; instead, he met with officers at the Australian Tax Office,
the Australian Treasury, and the New Zealand Inland Revenue Department in order
to better understand the draft and enacted legislation in those jurisdictions. He
made careful study of the laws of other countries. In this book, Edgar does not advocate for the wholesale adoption by Canada of the rules of any other jurisdiction;
instead, he uses the approaches from other jurisdictions as a starting place for the
discussion of possibilities. Ultimately, he a rgues for a comprehensive accrual regime
as a means of enacting expected-return taxation. Edgar’s summary explanation of
the aim of the monograph reveals that, by 2000, his initial focus on equivalent economic transactions has become entwined with his aim of preventing tax avoidance:
[T]he principal goal of policy makers should be the consistent taxation of equivalent
cash flows identified in terms of expected and unexpected gains and losses. This goal
ensures that perfectly substitutable transactions are taxed equivalently. The imperative
underlying this goal is the need to block revenue leakage from avoidance transactions
and minimize the associated welfare loss.50
49 Tim Edgar, The Income Tax Treatment of Financial Instruments: Theory and Practice (Toronto:
Canadian Tax Foundation, 2000). Amusingly, Edgar claims (at vii) that his “original intention
was to keep the monograph to a manageable size so that readers might be able to take it in with
a minimal commitment of time.” He also asserts that he “tried to maintain true to [his] goal of
providing an accessible overview of the tax-policy issues associated with financial instruments and
the related approaches to legislative design.” These seem like unrealistic (and unrealized) goals.
50 Tim Edgar, “Response: A Defensible and Workable Approach to the Income Tax Treatment of
Financial Instruments” (2002) 50:1 Canadian Tax Journal 249-58, at 251.
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In the year following the publication of his monograph (2001), Edgar published
three peer-reviewed articles—two in the New Zealand Journal of Taxation Law and
Policy 51 and one in the Canadian Tax Journal.52 Edgar’s publication venues make it
clear that by 2001, he has become an “insider” to the Australian and New Zealand
tax communities, resolving his position on one of the remaining comparative law
debates. The biographical entry for Edgar in two of the articles acknowledges his
work on secondment as a senior policy adviser with the New Zealand Inland Revenue Department, Policy Advice Division.53 Each of Edgar’s articles in the New
Zealand journal compares the approaches taken to financial instruments and personal tax shelters in Canada, the United States, New Zealand, and Australia. Each
article highlights concerns about the avoidance possibilities offered by the design of
current regimes.
This era also sees a shift in how Edgar uses his comparative knowledge in his
Canadian tax work. Fewer of his articles offer an explicitly comparative review, with
an extended discussion of the approaches that multiple jurisdictions take to a particular issue.54 More commonly during this period—particularly in articles where
he further develops his policy position on financial instruments or the taxation of
interest—Edgar simply alludes to how the works of American scholars and Australian and New Zealand policy makers have inspired his thinking. In a 2004 article, he
exhibits his characteristic modesty in offering a nod to those influences:

51 Tim Edgar, “Financial Instruments and the Tax Avoidance Lottery: A View from North
America” (2001) 6:2 New Zealand Journal of Taxation Law & Policy 63-102; Tim Edgar, “At-Risk
Rules as a Legislative Response to ‘Abusive’ Personal Tax Shelters” (2001) 7:4 New Zealand
Journal of Taxation Law & Policy 291-321.
52 Tim Edgar, “Exempt Treatment of Financial Intermediation Services Under a Value-Added
Tax: An Assessment of Alternatives” (2001) 49:5 Canadian Tax Journal 1133-99. This article is
not explicitly comparative, although it is clear that Edgar has benefited from his study of the
goods and services tax in Australia and New Zealand. It is the first of his articles to be focused
on the value added tax, and it is perhaps typical of Edgar’s working style in that it is long,
clocking in at almost 70 pages. In his biographical note, he thanks an external referee for
bringing his attention to the approaches used in Singapore and South Africa. In the article,
however, he does not appear to reference or build on those countries’ approaches. This seems
consistent with his approach to comparativism; typically, he uses only jurisdictions with which
he is willing to become highly familiar.
53 Edgar’s work with the New Zealand government seems to animate at least some of this 2002
report: New Zealand, Inland Revenue Department, GST & Financial Services: A Government
Discussion Document (Wellington, NZ: Inland Revenue Department, Policy Development
Division, 2002) (http://taxpolicy.ird.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2002-dd-gst-financial-services
.pdf ).
54 On the other hand, a few of Edgar’s articles in this era maintain that approach. See, for
example, Reuven Avi-Yonah, Tim Edgar, and Fadi Shaheen, “Stapled Securities—‘The Next
Big Thing’ for Income Trusts? Useful Lessons from the US Experience with Stapled Shares”
(2007) 55:2 Canadian Tax Journal 247-88. (In this article, the authors offer a review of the US
response to the taxation of stapled share structures as an illustration of a sensible direction for
Canada.)
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I confess that there is little in this paper that is original. The policy case for restrictions
on the deduction of interest expense is well developed in the literature, which is the
almost exclusive preserve of a handful of tax academics at US law schools.55

Another feature of his work in this decade—and one that represents, I believe, a
distinctively Edgarian contribution to comparative tax scholarship—is a marked
increase in the amount of space that he devotes to the articulation of the policy
problem to be solved. In a 2003 article on corporation income tax coordination, for
example, he devotes 18 pages to articulating and resolving the policy interaction of
international tax competition and international tax arbitrage.56 Ultimately, he takes
a different tack from the previous literature on those two phenomena, arguing in
favour of framing the policy problem as the perfect or near-perfect substitutability
of higher- for lower-taxed transactions. As a result, he sees international tax competition and tax arbitrage as linked and the required policy response as common. This
2003 article is not explicitly comparative. I would observe, however, that the exercise of thinking comparatively—that is, of considering the different ways in which
different jurisdictions identify and resolve tax policy problems—trains researchers
to better articulate the policy problem they believe they are addressing. That being
the case, Edgar’s previous comparative work stands him in good stead in these articles
because his accustomed type of thinking helps him approach old issues in new ways,
which is one of the main attributes of comparative law.
Finally, by his second decade, Edgar had clearly become—presumably in part
because of his comparative tax expertise—a valued (if not always heeded) government adviser. His scholarship reveals that, in addition to contributing (as noted
above) to the New Zealand government,57 he was serving as an adviser to the Canadian government.58 In 2008, recognizing the depth of Edgar’s Australian expertise,
the University of Sydney Law School formalized its academic connection with him,
and he began an ongoing arrangement with that university.59
55 Tm Edgar, “Policy Forum: Interest Deductibility Restrictions—Expecting Too Much from
REOP?” supra note 46, at 1133-72.
56 Tim Edgar, “Corporate Income Tax Coordination as a Response to International Tax Competition
and International Tax Arbitrage” (2003) 51:3 Canadian Tax Journal 1079-1158, at 1104-21.
57 See Ewen McCann and Tim Edgar, “The International Income Taxation of Portfolio Debt
in the Presence of Bi-Directional Capital Flows” (2006) 4:1 eJournal of Tax Research 5-24
(in which the authors acknowledge that a first draft of the paper was prepared for the New
Zealand “Tax Review 2001”).
58 In “The Trouble with Income Trusts” (2004) 52:3 Canadian Tax Journal 819-52, Edgar reports
that his article is a revised and condensed version of a background paper prepared for the
Department of Finance. In 2008, Edgar wrote a research report for the Advisory Panel on
Canada’s System of International Taxation: see Tim Edgar, Interest Deductibility Restrictions and
Inbound Direct Investment (Ottawa: Department of Finance, Advisory Panel on Canada’s System
of International Taxation, October 2008).
59 He held a unit of study appointment there in 2008 and 2009 and was appointed to staff
between 2010 and 2014.
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The Third Decade (2010-2016): An Established and
Model Comparatist
The third decade of Edgar’s professional life was shorter than it should have been.
As a result, his publications in this decade were fewer than in the first two decades.
Yet even in this reduced output, Edgar’s comparativism is apparent. A book chapter
that he contributed in 2010 reflects his continued push for sensible rules in a
second-best (or third- or fourth-best) world.60 The focus of the chapter is the
appropriate policy response to three behavioural margins: the choice of intragroup
debt versus equity; the choice of location of external debt; and the choice of investment location. In his characteristic way, Edgar combines what had previously been
separate policy issues, with the result that he advocates for a modification of the
Australian or New Zealand thin capitalization regime.
A few years later, returning to work that builds on his early attention to UK tax
law and his career-long commitment to Australian tax law, Edgar published an article that lays out the policy implications of the academic literature on taxation and
risk taking (and, more specifically, the ability to transfer risk to the government
through the income tax system).61 In a novel application of his attention to comparable transactions, he argues for a loss limitation provision to restrict the transfer to
government of risk that flows from post-tax, perfectly hedged positions.
Finally, Edgar’s last major foray into policy (in 2015), while clearly not designed
as a capstone effort, serves both to bring his scholarship full circle and to substantially advance it.62 The topic—risk-based anti-avoidance rules—is not far from his
earliest work on the basic building blocks of financial arrangements (interest deductibility and classification of securities). He remains true to one of his primary
scholarly aims: the development of better law—law that is based on a clear articulation of the policy problem to be solved and on pragmatic solutions borrowed, where
applicable, from the insights gained through his study of the United States and the
United Kingdom and through his deep connections to Australia and New Zealand.
Indeed, the US and Australian approaches feature prominently in his policy recommendations. In this final article, Edgar’s work with comparator jurisdictions is
exemplary. He does not treat other jurisdictions as simply the subject of descriptive
study. Instead, he uses his insights into the law and policy of the United States—
insights generated from several decades of careful study and engagement—to bolster
(but not without caveats) his policy recommendations for Canadian tax law.

60 Tim Edgar, “Outbound Direct Investment and the Sourcing of Interest Expense for
Deductibility Purposes,” in Arthur J. Cockfield, ed., Globalization and Its Tax Discontents: Tax
Policy and International Investments: Essays in Honour of Alex Easson (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 2010), 60-83.
61 Tim Edgar and Amir Aghdaei, “Using the Tax System as Your Hedge Counterparty” (2013)
28:2 Australian Tax Forum 317-75.
62 Tim Edgar, “Risk-Based Overrides of Share Ownership as Specific Anti-Avoidance Rules”
(2015) 63:2 Canadian Tax Journal 397-465.
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CO N C L U S I O N
Having offered a detailed catalogue of Tim Edgar’s contributions to comparative tax
law scholarship, I will conclude with four general reflections about his work. First,
his work seems to have had, at least occasionally, an impact on policy. As my review
of his scholarship has shown, he was a consummate policy analyst and a committed
functionalist. Every one of his journal articles and book chapters includes recommendations for policy reform. And in some cases, the governments of Canada,
Australia, and New Zealand appear to have heeded his advice. While it is impossible
to claim that his work directly caused policy change, it is certain that the governments in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand reformed their thin capitalization
rules, their capital gains exemptions, and their taxation of financial instruments in
the wake of his substantial work on those topics. At least some of that impact was
likely the result of Edgar’s ability to point to the rules adopted in other jurisdictions,
rules that must have provided both technical guidance and political reassurance to
Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand policy makers.
Second, Edgar’s scholarly path serves as a model for tax comparatists. His sustained focus on a small number of countries, and the considerable amount of time
that he spent in Australia and New Zealand, made him, perhaps inadvertently, an
“insider” to those countries. His understanding of their social, political, and economic contexts (as well as his detailed knowledge of much of Australia’s and New
Zealand’s income tax law and goods and services tax law) made him a valuable contributor to the Australian and New Zealand landscapes of tax scholarship and
policy.63 Put another way, Edgar demonstrated a willingness to immerse himself in
the rules and contexts of the countries that he used for comparison purposes.
Third, Edgar was adept in his use of comparativism. At times, he used the tax
law framework of another jurisdiction to urge Canada’s (or another country’s)
policy makers to make changes. At other times, he engaged in comparative work
in order to ensure that his articulation of policy options was complete. There were
occasions when he verged on using comparative work to promote the harmonization of countries’ regimes, in the service of preventing tax avoidance and abuse.
Perhaps most distinctively, relative to other tax comparatists, Edgar rarely suggests
wholesale tax transplants, despite what seems to be his general view that countries
should coordinate or harmonize their rules to reduce tax avoidance. Instead, he uses
the experiences of Australia, New Zealand, and the United States as springboards,
affording opportunities to see the policy choices available and to test them against
tax policy criteria.

63 In 2000, Edgar published an article on the Australian project related to the taxation of financial
arrangements, urging Australia to enact their proposed reforms. By that point in his career, he
was in a position to claim that these reforms were “the most thoroughly developed of any
government.” Tim Edgar, “The Taxation of Financial Arrangements (TOFA) Proposals: A
Modest and Defensible Agenda for Reform” (2000) 23:2 University of New South Wales Law
Journal 288-98.
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Fourth, and perhaps most significantly, Edgar made a distinguished and unique
contribution to the design of policy-relevant comparative tax-law research. As his
comparative work matured, it would typically include a section explicitly setting out
the policy problem to be resolved.64 In every case, this section would offer a novel
combination of real-world conditions that allowed him to clarify with unusual precision the problem that governments should be trying to solve in drafting tax laws.
I have not seen other comparative tax scholars emulate this approach, but they
should.
Edgar’s scholarly career answers the major questions of comparative law. He was
a thoughtful and considerable tax scholar whose countless contributions, which
have helped us better understand the tax world, are in some cases connected to
understanding, comparing, and evaluating the tax laws of other jurisdictions. His
scholarly work, seen in its entirety, suggests that Edgar did not set out to be a tax
comparatist. Rather, it suggests that he set out to be an outstanding tax scholar,
and comparative law provided him with an effective avenue for achieving that goal.

64 For an excellent example, see his co-authored 2013 article, Edgar and Aghdaei, supra note 61,
at 331-43.

